Antibody escape and global spread of SARS-CoV-2 lineage A.27 (preprint)

In spring 2021, an increasing number of infections was observed caused by the hitherto rarely described SARS-CoV-2 variant A.27 in south-west Germany. From December 2020 to June 2021 this lineage has been detected in 31 countries. Phylogeographic analyses of A.27 sequences obtained from national and international databases reveal a global spread of this lineage through multiple introductions from its inferred origin in Western Africa. Variant A.27 is characterized by a mutational pattern in the spike gene that includes the L18F, L452R and N501Y spike amino acid substitutions found in various variants of concern but lacks the globally dominant D614G. Neutralization assays demonstrated an escape of A.27 from convalescent and vaccine-elicited antibody-mediated immunity. Moreover, the therapeutic monoclonal antibody Bamlanivimab and partially the REGN-COV2 cocktail failed to block infection by A.27. Our data emphasize the need for continued global monitoring of novel lineages because of the independent evolution of new escape mutations.

A year of genomic surveillance reveals how the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic unfolded in Africa (preprint)

The progression of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic in Africa has so far been heterogeneous and the full impact is not yet well understood. Here, we describe the genomic epidemiology using a dataset of 8746 genomes from 33 African countries and two overseas territories. We show that the epidemics in most countries were initiated by importations, predominantly from Europe, which diminished following the early introduction of international travel restrictions. As the pandemic progressed, ongoing transmission in many countries and increasing mobility led to the emergence and spread within the continent of many variants of concern and interest, such as B.1.351, B.1.525, A.23.1 and C.1.1. Although distorted by low sampling numbers and blind-spots, the findings highlight that Africa must not be left behind in the global pandemic response, otherwise it could become a breeding ground for new variants.

Travel-driven emergence and spread of SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.620 with multiple VOC-like mutations and deletions in Europe (preprint)

Many high-income countries have met the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic with overwhelming sequencing resources and have identified numerous distinct lineages, including some with notably altered biology. Over a year into the pandemic following unprecedented reductions in worldwide human mobility, distinct introduced lineages of SARS-CoV-2 without sequenced antecedents are increasingly discovered in high-income countries as a result of ongoing SARS-CoV-2 genomic surveillance initiatives. We here describe one such SARS-CoV-2 lineage, carrying many mutations and deletions in the spike protein shared with widespread variants of concern (VOCs), including E484K, S477N and deletions HV69del, Y144del, and LLA241/243del. This lineage - designated B.1.620 - is known to circulate in Lithuania and has now been found in several European states, but also in increasing numbers in central Africa owing to important recent increases in genome sequencing efforts on the continent. We provide evidence of likely ongoing local transmission of B.1.620 in Lithuania, France, Germany, Spain, Belgium and the Central African Republic. We describe the suite of mutations this lineage carries, its potential to be resistant to neutralising antibodies, travel histories for a subset of the European cases, and evidence of local B.1.620 transmission in Europe. We make a case for the likely Central African origin of this lineage by providing travel records as well as the outcomes of carefully crafted phylogenetic and phylogeographic inference methodologies, the latter of which is able to exploit individual travel histories recorded for infected travellers having entered different European countries.

SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern, variants of interest and lineage A.27 are on the rise in Côte d’Ivoire (preprint)

SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern (VOC) and variants of interest (VOI) are heavily altering the COVID-19 pandemic’s course due to their increased transmissibility, virulence and immune escape abilities. Data on their spread in western sub-Saharan Africa is however still scarce. We therefore sequenced viral genomes from SARS-CoV-2 cases identified in central and northern Côte d’Ivoire between May 2020 and March 2021. We report the introduction of VOC B.1.1.7 as early as mid-January 2021, followed by detection of a single case of VOC B.1.351, as well as VOI B.1.525. Since early 2021 VOC/VOI are gradually dominating the SARS-CoV-2 virus pool in Côte d’Ivoire, as seen in other regions of the world. Intriguingly, we also find that another lineage, A.27, has also been on the rise over the same period. In sum, this study highlights again the extremely rapid local diffusion of VOC, VOI and possibly A.27, and the importance of further reinforcing capacities for genomic surveillance on the African continent.

Risk of Human-to-Wildlife Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 (preprint)

It has been a long time since the world has experienced a pandemic with such a rapid devastating impact as the current COVID-19 pandemic. The causative agent, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is further unusual in that it appears capable of infecting many different mammal species. As a significant proportion of people worldwide are infected with SARS-CoV-2 and may spread the infection unknowingly before symptoms occur or without any symptoms ever occurring, there is a non-negligible risk of humans spreading SARS-CoV-2 to wildlife, in particular mammals. Because of SARS-CoV-2’s evolutionary origins in bats and reports of humans transmitting the virus to pets and zoo animals, regulations for prevention of human-to-animal transmission have so far focused mostly on these animal groups. Here, we summarize recent studies and reports that show that a wide range of distantly related mammals are likely susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 and that susceptibility or resistance to the virus is in general not predictable, or only to some extent, by phylogenetic proximity to known susceptible or resistant hosts. In the absence of solid evidence on the SARS-CoV-2 susceptibility/resistance for each of the >5,500 mammal species, we argue that sanitary precautions should be taken when interacting with any mammal species in the wild. Preventing human-to-wildlife SARS-CoV-2 transmission is important for protecting these (sometimes endangered) animals from disease, but also to avoid establishment of novel SARS-CoV-2 reservoirs in wild animals. The risk of repeated re-infection of humans from such a wildlife reservoir could severely hamper SARS-CoV-2 control efforts. For wildlife fieldworkers interacting directly or indirectly with mammals, we recommend sanitary precautions such as physical distancing, wearing face masks and gloves, and frequent decontamination, which are very similar to regulations currently imposed to prevent transmission among humans.